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The Cognition and Performance of Resonant 
Temporalities in Richard III 
Joe Keener, Indiana University-Kokomo 
ith Shakespeare it’s all about time. Indeed, there are few 
playwrights so “time-beguiled as Shakespeare, yet few 
are as free from ritual repetitions of the temporal theme” 
(Fletcher 70). Shakespeare’s body of work includes 1100 uses of the word 
“time,” not including its variants, and 34 of those instances appear in 
Richard III, yet the play’s use of linguistic time referents almost always 
seems conditional and contingent. The word “if” clocks in at 87 times, “yet” 
42, “when” and “then” at 65 and 82 respectively.      
It may seem tentative in its linguistic signifiers, but temporality, or, 
more accurately, temporalities, are significant in Richard III and its 
performance. The times represented in Shakespeare’s play are 
concomitant, can be concurrent, and are often conceptualized. The very 
first word of the play is “now,” while the penultimate poetic line begins with 
“Now civil wounds are stopped.” (5.5.40). Both the signifiers and the 
signified of “now” and “time” resonate throughout Richard III yet can be 
difficult to delineate due to the intricate nature of the temporal mélange of 
the play. Performing, observing, and, to a lesser extent, reading 
Shakespeare’s play reveal a multiplicity of times: Historical, Fictive, and 
Quotidian.  
The analytical endeavor offered here reveals a myriad of ontological 
and epistemological concerns informed by distributed cognition, and, in a 
sense, creates a far-ranging cognitive inclusivity, as seen in Richard III and 
the world around it. Time is in the history books, in stage history, in 
productions, on the stage, in the actors, in the audience, and outside of the 
theatre, and what ties all of these together, and composes resonant 
temporalities, is the act of cognition.   
In Shakespeare, Theater, and Time Matthew Wagner argues for a 
“temporal thickness,” as if all times are layered into one experience (13), 
whereas, coming from a Performance Studies perspective, Jerzy Limon 
W 
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asserts that these plays have time streams that flow in variable speeds and 
currents and are demarcated by what he calls the “fifth wall” (“Time” 216).  
How do humans perceive, much less understand, these intricate matrices 
of temporality? Gone are the days of conceptualizing audiences as passive 
receivers of plays: just as humans do not inertly take in their cultures or 
the world around them, they do not catatonically accept the theatrical 
experience and the representations of time therein—theatre is an act of 
cognition. Cognition is not just neuronal impulses and synaptic strength, 
not just all in the head, but a part of a system. “Distributed,” “Embodied,” 
“Situated,” “Extended,” and “Socially and Culturally Distributed” are 
different ways cognition has been theorized, but their difference is in 
degree, not kind. Some terms stress information storage in matter, such as 
costumes or lighting, whereas others emphasize shared cognition outside 
of the isolated brain. What ties all of these ideas together is that, as 
Lawrence Shapiro asserts in Embodied Cognition, “Cognition emerges 
from dynamical interactions among the brain, body, and world” (125). A 
recent article in the journal Cognitive Systems Research adds that 
“individual cognition is supported by, and is mutually co-constructed by 
larger social, institutional, normative, political, technological, and cultural 
systems and practices” (Cash 61). The brain, the culture of the spectator, 
the theatre, the play, the artist, the culture of the playwright, every element 
of production, are all part of a Mobius strip of distributed cognition, which 
is a neuronal impulse repeating itself across the varied constituents of that 
distribution.  
David Herman aspires to draw all of these ways of categorizing 
cognitive systems into what he sees as “the nexus of brain, body, and 
environment (or world), ‘which he dubs the “mind’ ” (165). The term is 
useful. Still, considering that cognition is an act beyond our individual 
brains, how does all of this theorizing help spectators deal with the “fifth 
wall” or “temporal thickness” of all the time streams flowing through a 
production of Richard III? In her book Shakespeare Neuroplay, Amy Cook 
considers Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT), contending that “Blends are 
constructions of meaning based on the projection of information from two 
or more input spaces to a blended space, such that the blended meaning 
contains information and structure from more than one space” (11).   Cook 
coins the term “neuroplay” for the neurological transaction between 
performer and spectator, “performed and received, staged and housed, you 
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and me, at the same time” (153). Part of this theatrical neuroplay is the 
cognitive blend of resonant temporalities in plays like Richard III. 
Historical, Fictive, or Quotidian time in Shakespeare’s play is a cognitive 
blend distributed across an entire system of cognition. For the ease of 
discussion, these three temporalities can be scrutinized individually, but 
they exist contemporaneously in the cognitive blend of the play. Historical 
time can mean everything, both real and fictive, that took place before the 
commencement of the play—it’s the tense of the past. Fictive time is the 
temporal setting of the play in which the characters and occurrences exist, 
a sort of present lie in that it progresses in narrative time, not the time it 
takes the actors to complete the play. The play’s present is a lie in the sense 
that it differs from the audience’s present. Quotidian time would be the 
“real” time as experienced by actors, spectators, and the larger world 
around them. 
Like all of Shakespeare’s history plays, Richard III’s Historical time 
seems paradoxically cohesive and fragmented at the same time. The real 
world historical people and events that transpired long before the play was 
even written represent one stream of Historical time, while the history of 
theatrical production and spectatorship offers two other manifestations. 
One could also argue there are even Historical-Fictive or Historical-
Quotidian times, as the play unfolds in the time of its setting, making its 
fictions historical through continued movement within that time, and the 
Quotidian, real world around it, constantly making the present turn into 
history, the hour of performance later than when first begun. Little wonder 
Majorie Garber posits in Shakespeare After All that productions of the 
history plays tend to conflate times (314). To extend and complement 
Garber’s assertion, such is the very nature of the cognition of time in the 
theatre that it is nearly impossible to not conflate times as they resonate in 
this highly particularized environment.  
From the onset of the play, Richard does his best to bring time into 
the present when he opens with “Now is the winter of our discontent/ Made 
glorious summer by this son of York” (1.1-2), but by the second act, the 
First Citizen notes: “So stood the state when Henry the Sixth/ Was crowned 
in Paris but at nine months old” (2.3.16-18). The play is haunted by the 
past, and not just the real-world, historical episodes, but Shakespeare’s 
Henry the Sixth trilogy of history plays, which dramatizes the War of the 
Roses. The Plantagenet and Lancastrian thirty-two year struggle for the 
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throne left an indelible mark on the English history. Many in Shakespeare’s 
audience, and even audiences today, would be aware of both the historical 
record and Shakespeare’s previous first plays, the popular Henry the Sixth 
trilogy, written and performed in 1590-1592. Richard III, written in 1593-
1594, chronologically followed, not unlike its historical counterpart. Both 
the historical and performance record would connect these plays and 
events for audiences.  
Limon likens offstage Historical time to smaller events in the play’s 
narrative that are not viewed by the audience, seeing them as part of a 
framework that all belongs to what he calls “diegetic time,” or the totality 
of the time emanating from the play itself, not from some outside source 
(Chemistry 117). Regardless of its status as diegetic or not, Historical time 
is about memory, and an important part of memory is the cognitive 
capacity to track time, to compare and contrast. In Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences Corballis and Suddendorf postulate that “tracking of the passage 
of time typically activates the right hemispheric dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, which is also implicated in working memory which, along with 
judging temporal distance, may depend on the same dopamine-modulated 
neuronal system” (309). This cognitive relationship also has implications 
for the perception of the future: “Brain imaging has shown that both 
remembering the past and imagining the future are associated with frontal 
and temporal lobe activity, although there are specific areas in the frontal 
pole and medial temporal lobes that are more involved with the future than 
with the past” (Corballis 302). These processes are situated within Richard 
III, the production, actors, stage, theater, and the world.  
One of Shakespeare’s palpable images of the evocation of the past in 
Richard III are buildings, such as the Tower and Pontefract Castle. Prince 
Edward asks Buckingham if Julius Caesar had built the tower, which he 
affirms but also notes that “succeeding ages have re-edified”  (3.1.68-71). 
Queen Margaret refers to the tower in a past tense when she accuses 
Richard with, “Thou kill’dst my husband Henry in the Tower” (1.3.119) 
while Rivers harkens back to an earlier time, stating to the other doomed 
nobles that “Within the guilty closure of these walls/ Richard the Second 
here hacked to death” (3.1.11-12). These representations are signifiers that 
contain information; in these instances, despite the existence of both the 
Fictive and Quotidian time, among the information is Historic time, 
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smuggled into a system of Extended Cognition that does indeed seem like 
“temporal thickness.” 
Perhaps another view of how this act of cognition works is what Alan 
Richardson calls a “memory imagination system.” Neuroscientific 
accounts of said system see it as “looking backward and forward in time—
the ‘Janus Hypothesis’” and it “tends to emphasize the utility of such an 
arrangement, which provides an ‘adaptive’ rationale for the otherwise 
perplexing fragility of episodic memory” (234). Richard constantly exerts 
great effort to dictate the substance of this Janus Hypothesis, creating both 
the backward and forward looking when he tells Queen Margaret and 
Rivers “Let me put in your minds, if you forget,/ What you have been ere 
this, and what you are;/ Withal, what I have been, and what I am” (1.3.131-
133). Of all of Richard’s notorious ambitions, the struggle to control time 
and the other characters’ cognition of it is perhaps his most audacious and 
quixotic. One could argue that Richard strives to maintain this kind of 
domination of the audience too, as we spend more time alone, by far, with 
Richard than any other character. In fact, Richard looms large in the body 
of Shakespeare’s works, as the only bigger part in all of the plays is Hamlet. 
Richard’s first speech is 44 lines long, 42 of those spoken solus, on the 
stage. Thus, Richard often has the audience’s ear with little to no 
interruption. Even when he admits he’s a villain, Richard offers 
justification of how he was “Cheated of feature by dissembling Nature” 
(1.1.19) his Iagoian impulses wrapped in self-justification and suggestion. 
Richard attempts to dictate the Historic and, in a way, the Quotidian time, 
both past and present, with an eye toward the future.  
The same kind of endeavor exists between the actors, the stage, and 
the audience. Peter Brook once wrote, “So it is that Shakespeare succeeded 
where no one has succeeded before or since in writing plays that pass 
through many stages of consciousness” (88). While his Shakespearean 
exclusivity may be questionable, his main assertion holds true for not only 
characters, but for actors and audiences. After all, “Drama as Shakespeare 
contrived it lived in performance, not in publication; and, as such, it 
continually stimulated, and relied on, the cognition of spectators. On a 
virtually bare stage, Shakespeare’s collaborators were not only his fellow 
players but the playgoers, who provides reactions to what is both seen on 
the stage and what is referred to but not necessarily seen there. Cognitive 
responses to a play could always be seeded, but their outcome was not 
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certain” (Kinney 130). Distributed cognition, by its very nature, can only 
be consistent in the most general of ways. Artists can be sure of their 
intended spectators’ cognitive responses, but, as each audience has a 
distinct makeup, in a world full of varying spectator cognitive patterns, 
they will have to settle for the likelihood that audiences will complete their 
part of the distributed cognition system in the anticipated way.  
One reason for this lack of certainty is perception and cognition. 
Perception “involves ‘explaining away’ the driving (incoming) sensory 
signal by matching it with a cascade of predictions pitched at a variety of 
spatial and temporal scales. These predictions reflect what the [cognitive] 
system already knows about the world (including the body) and the 
uncertainties associated with its own processing. Perception here becomes 
‘theory-laden’ in at least one (rather specific) sense: what we perceive 
depends heavily upon a set of priors….that the brain brings to bear in its 
attempt to predict the current sensory signal” (Clark 187, insert mine). The 
mammalian brain is, in a sense, associative, and deals with incoming 
stimuli, such as a line in a play, by using prior stimulations to create 
predictions already known by the brain. To put an even finer point on it, 
“When two stimuli are delivered within a short interval, the response to the 
second stimulus can be either enhanced or depressed relative to the 
response to the first stimulus…Whether a synapse exhibits paired pulse 
facilitation or depression depends on the recent history of activation of that 
synapse” (Citri 18-19). This phenomenon is a sort of “neuronal learning” 
that reveals the plasticity of the mammalian brain and accounts for the 
individuality of audience members’ responses to the performance.  
 Every human being does not have the exact same priors, or the 
same history of synaptic response to previous neuronal firings, so it stands 
to reason that audiences would not process and therefore perceive any 
stimuli, much less something as complex as a play or the experience of 
time, in exactly the same way. Fictive time, sometimes called Literary time, 
works in this same way, and is especially resonant in Richard III. 
Shakespeare’s play and its characters are obsessed with Fictive time, 
constantly asking for the “O’clock.” Hastings queries “What is the o’clock,” 
and Buckingham declares “I go, and towards three or four o’clock.” Even 
Richard gets into these requests for the appropriate Fictive time, asking 
“Ay, what’s the o’clock,” and, after being told it is ten offers “Well, let it 
strike” (3.2.4, 3.6.101, 4.2.110-111). Later in the play he asks Catesby for the 
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“o’clock before the final battle starts, as “The clock striketh,” seeing in it 
and the movement of the sun as a harbinger of doom (5.3.46, 5.3.277). All 
of these demands are endeavoring to impress order on Fictive time, 
particularly in the last two acts of the play, as the audience can almost feel 
time running out for Richard, if not for the play and the theatrical 
experience.  
How the audience deals with Fictive time is as equally fluid as the 
characters on stage. In fact, “If, in the audience, we are told, either literally 
in dialogue or through any other means of communication that the theatre 
has at its disposal, that a night, or two days, or a year has passed while the 
dimming and raising of the stage lights blinked our eyes for us, we can 
accept it as a given. In this respect, the passage of time in the theatre is 
literary—we, the audience, project ourselves into a fictive world that is 
represented before us” (Wagner 24).  The repetition of these “projections,” 
on a neuronal level, leads to synaptic plasticity, which, “specifically refers 
to activity-dependent modification of the strength or efficacy of synaptic 
transmission at preexisting synapses, and for over a century has been 
proposed to play a central role in the capacity of the brain to incorporate 
transient experiences into persistent memory traces. Synaptic plasticity is 
also thought to play key roles in the early development of neural circuitry” 
(Citri 18). Perceiving and processing Fictive time could lead to a cognitive 
plasticity not available to merely Quotidian time, although the two are 
hardly divorced from each other. 
When Richard divulges “plots have I laid,” or Edward dies far from 
the audience’s presence or present, or Hastings’ decapitation is only seen 
and comprehended through Lovell and Ratcliff returning with his head in 
hand, it is intimated that there is a world offstage that remains part of the 
Fictive world and, therefore, of its time. While many tend to think of this 
world in spatial terms, where does it exist in time? “Many metaphors of 
time are based on space and the dynamics of movement in space. The 
conceptualization of time is thus in some way derived from the perception 
of movement in space” (Droit-Volet 494). As the audience watches actors 
move to and from these implied spaces/times in the wings of the theatre, 
our experience of that movement resolves itself into resonant times. Bruce 
McConachie explains the audience’s ability to create narrative cohesion out 
of these different times and spaces as “the part-whole primitive,” which 
“helps audiences to incorporate more and longer strands of these causal 
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sequences into a general narrative schema; spectators recognize that one 
strand is part of a longer whole and that this whole, and so on, becomes a 
part of an even larger whole, and so on, as they elaborate a nested hierarchy 
of incidents to shape their narrative comprehension” (Engaging 166). The 
time of the stage joins with the implied time offstage to create a temporal 
whole. Cognitive Blending Theory would support McConachie while 
realizing that this part/whole primitive is strictly an act of distributed 
cognition, as stated above, a neuronal impulse repeating itself across the 
varied constituents of that distribution.  
Quotidian and Fictive time are so concomitant as to regularly make 
parsing the two difficult. For example, there are many instances in Richard 
III where characters speak asides. In the company of Richard, Queen 
Margaret offers the aside “A murd’rous villain, and so still thou art” 
(1.3.134), or in the presence of Buckingham and Prince Edward, Richard, 
in reference to the young prince, ghoulishly utters as an aside “So wise, so 
young, they say, do never live long” (3.1.79). Does the speaker of the aside 
exist in the same time as those unable to hear? In the Fictive time, it seems 
they do not, as if all the characters freeze, or, at the very least, turn away, 
but in Quotidian time, or real time, the utterance unfolds in that time 
contemporaneously with the Fictive. One could treat the asides as 
characters merely muttering under their breaths, but it would still be a 
duration that the other characters would endure, muddying the waters of 
the Fictive and Quotidian. These asides are infused with curses, or 
predictions of the future, an important part of the Fictive time. Curses exist 
in Richard III as wishful prognostications of the future, and Shakespeare 
has an affinity for writing curses that have already been fulfilled in 
Historical time, never more so than in Richard III.   
The play’s near obsession with the art of prophecy, and characters 
cursing each other’s futures, also makes these two times intertwine. Queen 
Margaret’s execration of Elizabeth that “Long mayest thou live to wail thy 
children’s death,” is rebuffed but followed by her rejoinder “O, but 
remember this another day,/ When he shall split thy very heart with 
sorrow./ And say poor Margaret is a prophetess” (1.3.299-301) or when the 
Duchess of York curses Richard with “Bloody thou are, bloody will be thy 
end” (4.4.195), there is a sense of fait accompli in seemingly all possible 
times on the stage. The curses are eventually made manifest in the Fictive 
World and Time of the play, with Elizabeth losing everything and Richard 
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offering “My Kingdom for a horse!” before he is slain by Richmond (5.4.13). 
At the same time, these events come to pass during “the two hours traffic 
of our stage” (Romeo 1.1.12), played out in the real time of the theatrical 
experience. Both the Fictive and Quotidian times are vital parts of the 
distributed cognition that makes up the world of the theatre. Limon posits 
that “the spectator can be in or out of the resultant blend, and can also ‘live 
in the blend,’ often below the level of consciousness” (Chemistry 14). It is 
the “in and out” that is difficult for the artist to always foresee, particularly 
as audience members do not always move between the two in conscious, 
much less consistent, ways. Playwrights and other theatrical artists must 
depend on varied blended spaces that live within the possibility of the 
grammar of the theatre, or its unique customs and traditions, such as the 
relationship between the audience and the stage/actors/language/etc. to 
make meaning.   
Performance practices help create these cognitive blends, as “they 
are historically, culturally, socially, and aesthetically contingent behaviors 
that remake the text, constitute the event, mediate our participation in its 
performance and sometimes, incidentally, convey an effect of 
representation” (Worthen 145). However, distributed cognition works 
both ways, as the audience “engages in a conceptual process designed to 
transform the stage and its activities into a structured fiction” (Garner 
XVII). Shakespeare’s texts are also part of this distribution that cognitively 
helps humans make meaning, but Mary Crane Thomas reminds us 
“Meaning is not just the product of an exterior system of signs but is 
fundamentally structured by human cognitive processes….meanings that 
are determined by the interaction of the physical world, culture, and these 
human cognitive systems” (21, 12). In other words, Herman’s idea of the 
mind, as discussed above.    
The time between acts and scenes, or the “dream time” when ghosts 
walk the earth, add to this discussion of cognition and Richard III. The 
ghosts of Prince Edward, Henry the Sixth, Clarence, Rivers, Grey, and 
Vaughn all enter severally and speak to Richard and Richmond, offering 
curses and praise for the following day, but these figures are radical 
members of the past of the play, dragged by seemingly some greater force 
than Shakespeare’s quill. Is this Fictive time? Quotidian? Neither? Both? 
This uncertainty is, no doubt, how Shakespeare, looking through the lens 
of Historical time, problematizes the idea of the other two times, hence the 
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label of “supernatural,” with its inability to fit neatly into anything other 
than a “dream time.” Both supernatural and dream time imply their 
opposites, a sort of natural, waking time, which are really just synonyms 
for Quotidian time, another part of the temporal thickness that exists in 
the attempt to tell a story from the theatrical stage.  
 In one such story, Richard III, Queen Elizabeth admonishes 
Richard with “An honest tale speeds best when plainly told” (4.4.361). The 
argument in this paper is that telling stories is never so plain or simple, 
especially when it comes to resonant temporalities and how they play out 
not only on the stage but in the audience’s real life. Theatre is an extended, 
heightened, and complicated version of the temporalities outside the 
confines of its performative space. Richard III reveals how plays, the 
theatre, actors, productions, the brain, memory, blended spaces, image 
schemas, and various forms of time are all integral to the theatre-going 
experience and the distributed cognition used therein..  
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